Introduction
accruals anomaly is one of the most closely studied topics in academic accounting. Despite this attention, scholars are fiercely divided on whether the anomaly really represents market mispricing, what causes it, why it has not been arbitraged away, and whether an investor can earn rents by trading on it. 1 In this paper, we bring evidence to bear on these questions by studying the anomaly's current demise-namely, the observation that the hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) accruals anomaly have decayed in US stock markets to the point that they are no longer positive. In doing so, our postmortem seeks to not only shed light on one of the most puzzling findings in accounting research, but also to explore when and how accounting researchers can play a causally more -value-relevant‖ role in the capital markets.
The simplicity of the accruals strategy and the size of the returns it generates have led some scholars to conclude that the anomaly is illusory. For example, Khan (2008) and Wu et al. (2009) argue that the anomaly can be explained by a misspecified risk model and the q-theory of time-varying discount rates, respectively; Desai et al. (2004) conclude that the anomaly is deceptive because it is subsumed by a different strategy; Kraft et al. (2006) attribute it to outliers and look-ahead biases; Ng (2005) proposes that the anomaly's abnormal returns are compensation for high exposure to bankruptcy risk; and Zach (2006) argues that there are firm characteristics are correlated with accruals that cause the return pattern.
In contrast, authors such as Lev and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) argue that the anomaly does exist but that significant economic barriers prevent it from being arbitraged away. For example, using data through 2003 Lev and Nissim (2006) conclude that the anomaly is real, -still persists and, even more strikingly, its magnitude has not declined over time‖ (p.193 ) and that it is -likely that the accruals anomaly will endure for quite some time‖ (p.222) because it stems from the characteristics of firms in the highest/lowest accrual deciles and certain structural barriers facing arbitrageurs, such as prudent-man rules, liquidity concerns, transaction and information costs. In a related vein, Mashruwala et al. (2006) propose that -even 1 Researchers have also investigated the time series properties of accruals, seeking to understand why accruals are less persistent than earnings and why market participants do not fully understand and/or learn about this differential persistence. For example, Fairfield et al. (2003) , and Dechow et al. (2008) have proposed that the differential timeseries behavior of cash flows and accruals stem from diminishing returns to investment, Richardson et al. (2006) and Rajan et al. (2007) examine the interactions between possible growth and the conservative nature of accounting, and Xie (2001) , Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Richardson et al. (2005) investigate accounting distortions created by managers.
if smart arbitrageurs were to understand the implications of accruals for future earnings, they are likely to be constrained by excessive exposure to idiosyncratic volatility and transaction costs to eliminate the mispricing related to accruals‖ (p.5).
Fracturing the picture further, the views and actions of sophisticated practitioners differ from both academic perspectives in that large, quantitatively-oriented investors have actively sought to exploit the anomaly. For example, in its 10/4/04 cover story that features Richard Sloan, BusinessWeek notes that:
- [I] nvestors are clamoring to exploit this market inefficiency. -They seem in a bit of a frenzy about it,‖ says Sloan … But as more people catch on, this trading opportunity should diminish. How long it lasts depends on the ability and determination of investors to review earnings estimates skeptically … More portfolio managers are using sophisticated screening to identify companies that make aggressive estimates … Goldman Sachs Asset Management, BGI, Citadel, Starmine, and Susquehanna Financial Group, among many others, are employing versions of the Sloan-Richardson models to guide their investments. Strategists at brokerages, including Sanford C. Bernstein Research, CSFB, and UBS have built model portfolios using similar techniques.‖
The results of this focus on the anomaly by professional money managers appear to have been successful but dissipative. For example, BusinessWeek reported in 1/07 that -Earnings quality has been BGI's single largest source of alpha over the last decade‖ but at the same time Ron Kahn, BGI's then global head of equity research, stated in 1/09 that -Buying companies with high quality earnings and shorting those most dependent on accruals proved a good strategy, until the market figured it out‖ (Financial Times, 1/26/09, p.4, emphasis added).
Given the conflicting views across academics and practitioners, our paper has two main goals. First, we empirically assess the hypothesis that the accruals anomaly continues to earn abnormal returns. Our methods differ from most prior research in that they use Compustat Pointin-Time data to more closely replicate the nature and timing of accruals information available to institutional investors in real-time, and extend the window of study through December 2008, some five years after the 2003 endpoint used by Lev and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) . We find that raw and risk-adjusted returns to the anomaly have currently reached the point that they are no longer positive. Our results are robust to different specification and robustness checks, including alternative methods for adjusting for risk, using other definitions of accruals, using various scalars, value-versus equally-weighting hedge returns, and conditioning on firm size.
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Our second goal is to propose and empirically evaluate alternative explanations for why hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) accruals anomaly are no longer positive. The approach we take centers on analyzing the associations between the hedge returns and proxies for the size of the accruals mispricing signal and the level of economic attention paid by hedge funds to exploiting the anomaly, while also taking into account a wide variety of other explanations derived from the large academic literature on the pricing of accruals.
Our results are unavoidably imprecise because of the short time-series of data and highly inter-correlated explanatory variables, making it hard to arrive at causal inferences. Bearing this in mind, we nevertheless find results that we believe are consistent with the proposition that the anomaly's demise reflects two main factors: A decline in the size of the mispricing signal (as measured by accruals in the extreme accrual deciles and the relative persistence of cash flows and accruals) and an increase in the capital invested by hedge funds in exploiting the signal (as measured by hedge fund assets under management and trading volume in extreme accrual firms).
We suggest that the evidence we report indicates that quantitative hedge fundsparticularly those advised by prominent accounting academics or staffed with Ph.D.-trained professionals-are relevant for understanding why the accruals anomaly is currently not yielding positive returns. Although ours is not the first paper to document that the returns to an accounting-based anomaly can decline after the anomaly is publicized (Johnson and Schwartz (2001) provide similar evidence on the demise of post-earnings announcement drift after the Bernard and Thomas papers were published), our study is the first to test for a connection between anomaly returns and hedge funds. Specifically, the accruals anomaly was discovered during a period of time when hedge funds in general, and quantitative hedge funds in particular, were beginning to emerge (e.g., Long Term Capital Management). Unlike the symmetric profitability of the long and short sides of the post-earnings announcement drift, Sloan (1996) and others found that most of the hedge returns to the accruals anomaly were on the short side.
As such, the returns to the accruals anomaly could be better realized and levered by quantitative hedge funds than by long-only mutual funds or fundamental traders. Moreover, the accruals anomaly was not just studied by its discoverer and the authors of related research academics such as Charles Lee and Scott Richardson. It was actively exploited by prominent hedge funds hiring the researchers away from their academic positions to work full-time for the funds. In our view, this indicates that accounting scholarship can causally affect, not just associatively study, stock prices and investment flows in capital markets.
Our results also indicate that neither knowledge of the accruals anomaly nor capital flowing into exploiting it were rapid enough to cause prices to instantly adjust upon the 1996 publication of Sloan's seminal article in The Accounting Review. Instead, the anomaly's demise took years to occur. In this regard our work parallels the -slow moving capital‖ findings of Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) and is consistent with Lee's (2001) view on inadequacy of the assumption that price always equals fundamental value:
-In my mind, it [the assumption that price always equals fundamental value] is an over simplification that fails to capture the richness of market pricing dynamics and the process of price discovery. Prices do not adjust to fundamental value instantly by fiat. Price convergence toward fundamental value is better characterized as a process, which is accomplished through the interplay between noise traders and information arbitrageurs. This process requires time and effort, and is only achieved at substantial cost to society.‖ (Lee, 2001, p.235) Finally, we note that while hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) accruals anomaly are not currently positive, we are not so bold as to predict that they will always remain insignificant.
The turmoil in 2007-2009 in the returns experienced by quantitative hedge fund strategies has suggested to some researchers that much remains to be understood about the impacts that hedge fund strategies can have on prices (Khandani and Lo, 2008; Lundholm, 2008; Stein, 2009 ).
Moreover, as Lo (2004) argues in putting forward his adaptive markets hypothesis, the profitability of an investment strategy depends on business conditions, the number and types of investors implementing the strategy, and the type and magnitude of profit opportunities in other strategies-none of which are likely to remain fixed over time.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the datasets we use, the time period we study, and our primary result regarding the erosion of positive returns to the accruals anomaly. In section 3, we lay out a variety of explanations for the persistence of the anomaly and in section 4 study the ability of the varying explanations to explain its demise, particularly the role played by hedge funds. We conclude the paper in section 5. is the first year in the Point-in-Time database for which 12-month accrual deciles can be formed.
Our sample consists of all non-financial common stocks on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ with a 12/31 fiscal-year-end. 4 Raw returns are adjusted for delisting.
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Deliberately mirroring Sloan's definition (1996, p.293) , we measure annual dollar accruals as:
where CA = current assets, Cash = cash and cash equivalents, CL = current liabilities, STD = debt included in current liabilities, TP = income taxes payable, Dep = depreciation and amortization expense, and indicates the 12-month change in balance sheet items. Unlike
Sloan, though, we compute annual accruals from quarterly financial statements using the most recent and lagged four quarters financial statements available as of March 31 st each year. We compute the balance sheet measure even though the statement of cash flow measure is readily available throughout our entire sample period because this is the one used by Sloan (1996) . Per Sloan, we scale dollar accruals by average annual total assets.
The rolling 12-month accrual measure is consistent with the data that are available to hedge funds. For example, many institutional investors obtain their fundamental data via frequent updates from Compustat. In addition, the method is consistent with the evidence in Lev and Nissim (2006) that institutional investors attempt to arbitrage the anomaly prior to the end of 3 Compustat's Point-in-Time data also contains restated financial statement data where that would have been available in real-time. As such, it is representative of the information available to sophisticated investors such as hedge funds. See Livnat and López-Espinosa (2008) for one of the few papers to have used Point-in-Time data. 4 Financial companies are defined as those with SIC 6000-6999. 5 Following Shumway and Warther (1999) , if delisting returns are missing from the CRSP event file then we set the delisting return for NYSE or AMEX (NASDAQ) to -35% (-55%).
the fiscal year. However, our results are insensitive to whether we estimate accruals using this method or the simple annual measure used by Sloan (1996) .
We report both raw and risk-adjusted zero net investment hedge returns to implementing the accruals strategy. Raw returns are defined as the value-weighted long/short dollar-neutral monthly raw returns to investing in the bottom/top deciles of scaled accruals ranked on March 31 st with positions beginning April 1 st and ending 12 months later. Value-weighting is determined by the market value of equity immediately prior to portfolio formation (i.e., using closing prices on March 31 st ). We use value-weighted rather than equally-weighted returns because equal-weighting tilts the portfolio heavily toward small cap stocks where the total costs of moving into and out of positions are much higher than they are for large cap stocks. As such, we expect that the value-weighted returns series are closer to those that would be obtained after accounting for such costs than are equally-weighted returns. The number of firms in our hedge portfolios ranges between approximately 300 and 600 per month.
We measure risk-adjusted hedge portfolio returns by subtracting the predicted return estimated from time-series regressions of earlier hedge portfolio returns on value-weighted market returns minus the risk free rate, the Fama and French size and book-to-market factors, and a momentum factor. The 36-month rolling window regressions are estimated in sample for the first 36 months and then estimated on a 36-month rolling window starting in the 37 th month. Sloan's (1996) Figure 1 by plotting the natural log of one plus the cumulative buy-and-hold monthly raw and value-weighted four-factor risk-adjusted hedge returns. 8 The shape of Figure 2 suggests that monthly hedge returns have decayed in US stock markets to the point that they are no longer positive, supporting the views of sophisticated practitioners who have publicly stated that Sloan's (1996) accruals strategy is no longer a profitable source of alpha because -the market has figured it out‖ (Kahn, 2009).
Hedge returns to
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This conclusion is echoed numerically in Table 1 where we report key statistics on the monthly hedge return series and on the excess returns on the value-weighted market returns and the returns to the SMB, HML and UMD factors over each of the three subperiods. 11 Sharpe ratios for factor 7 For example, Charles Lee worked full-time at BGI between 7/04 and 7/08 as Director of Accounting Research, Head of U.S. Equity Research, Co-Head of N. America Active Equity, and Global Head of Equity Research. 8 The nature of a log scale is such that an increase (decrease) of 0.69 equates to a doubling (halving) of value, so that unlike a non-log scale, an increase in asset value in period t of 0.69 followed by a decrease of -0.69 in period t+1 yields the initial asset value. In a non-log scale, an increase in asset value in period t of say 50% followed by a decrease of -50% in period t+1 does not yield the initial asset value (the required increase in period t is 100%). 9 After our research was well underway, we came across studies by Leippold and Lohre (2008) and Gerard, Guido and Koutsoyannis (2009) that report a similar graph to those in Figure 2 . In neither case, however, is the research question studied related to either documenting or explaining the demise of Sloan's (1996) annual accruals anomaly. 10 We caution against making strong inferences from the negative measured hedge returns to the anomaly in the end of the sample period in Figure 2 . We investigated numerous variations of Sloan's (1996) definition of accruals, scalars and data-for example, defining cash flows from the statement of cash flows, scaling by book equity, and using traditional Compustat data. Some of those permutations share the negative returns for 2005-08 shown in Figure 2 , and some do not. We chose to stay as close as possible to the definitions proposed in Sloan (1996) in order to avoid a -pick the best looking cumulative returns Figure‖ bias. This is not to say that we believe that hedge funds would simplistically trade using Sloan's (1996) cash flow definition and scalar. Offline conversations with personnel at large hedge funds strongly suggest that hedge funds apply far more sophisticated approaches than we have reported. However, what we do find is that almost every variation we tried led us to the same conclusion that the anomaly existed once but has dissipated away in recent years. 11 We subtract the risk-free rate from the value-weighted market to properly compare market returns with those of the accruals anomaly hedge returns and the returns to the SMB, HML and UMD factors. The subtraction of the riskfree rate is necessary because the accruals anomaly hedge returns and the returns to the SMB, HML and UMD factors are based on zero net investment capital positions.
returns and hedge returns are computed as the mean return divided by the standard deviation of returns under the assumption that short proceeds earn the one-month US Treasury Bill rate. Table 1 indicates that mean raw and risk-adjusted accruals anomaly hedge returns are reliably positive in the first subperiod; are positive but not reliably so in the second period; and are negative but not reliably so in the third subperiod. For both raw and risk-adjusted returns, the differences in mean returns between the first and second, and second and third, subperiods are insignificant, but significant between the first and third subperiods. In addition, the t-statistic on the raw hedge return drops from 2.58 to 1.36 to -1.04 through the subperiods.
In Table 2 we report the results of estimating the monthly size and book-to-market riskadjusted hedge returns as a function of TIME (Model I), and the cumulative buy-and-hold monthly risk-adjusted hedge portfolio returns as a function of TIME and TIMESQ = TIME x TIME (Model II). TIME is set to 0.01 in April 1989 and is incremented by 0.01 each month thereafter. If the returns to the accruals anomaly initially existed but diminished over time then
in Model I the intercept will be positive and the coefficient on TIME will be negative, while in
Model II the coefficient on TIME will be positive and the coefficient on TIMESQ will be negative (because of the cumulative nature of the returns as the dependent variable).
The results reported in Table 2 from both Model specifications support the proposition that the accruals anomaly were positive but have diminished over time. In Model I the estimated intercept is reliably positive and the estimated coefficient on TIME is reliably negative, while in
Model II the estimated coefficient on TIME is reliably positive and the estimated coefficient on TIMESQ is reliably negative.
Robustness tests
In untabulated tests, we find that the key conclusion we draw from Figure 1 -namely, that the hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) standard accruals anomaly have decayed in US stock markets to the point that they are now no longer positive-is robust to many different specification and robustness checks. These include:
Adjusting for risk using book-to-market as well as size-matched returns. Using alternative definitions of accruals (balance sheet and income statement; rolling 12-month window and annual). Using alternative scalars (total assets, total shareholder equity, and annual net income).
Computing equally-weighted hedge returns. Conditioning on firm size (examining hedge returns separately for large, medium and small capitalization firms). Using cutoffs other than the extreme deciles by looking at the hedge returns to less extreme deciles. Using $5 as a minimum stock price cut-off.
Explanations for the demise of the accruals anomaly
In this section, we propose explanations for why the hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) basic accruals investment strategy have decayed to the point that they are currently no longer positive. Given the interest that large hedge funds have shown in exploiting the anomaly (BusinessWeek, 2004), we first develop an explanation centered on hedge funds and then cover a variety of other explanations based on alternative explanations taken from prior research. For each explanation, we develop one or more proxies for the relevant underlying variable(s), and predict the sign of the relation between each proxy and hedge returns to the anomaly. As we describe more in section 4, we then test these predictions using the aggregated time-series of monthly hedge returns plotted in Figure 2 , and also using full panel monthly return data on firms across all accrual deciles.
An explanation centered on hedge funds
Hedge funds have existed at least since Alfred Winslow Jones started a long-short fund in the late 1940s. Since then the number of hedge funds and the assets they manage have grown, and explosively so since the early 2000s (Stultz, 2007) . Until the end of the 1990s hedge funds accounted for only a small fraction of the capital managed by the financial industry (President's Working Group on Financial Markets, 1999). By the mid-2000's, however, hedge funds had grown to account for a large portion of the trading on major exchanges (Stulz, 2007) .
Hedge funds differ from other financial institutions in economically important ways that we contend make them a prime candidate for explaining the recent demise of the accruals anomaly. Specifically, unlike most mutual funds, pension funds and small individual investors that are legally constrained or much less sophisticated, hedge funds are unregulated, can short sell securities at low cost, employ substantial amounts of leverage at low cost, and include derivatives in their portfolios (President's Working Group on Financial Markets, 1999). Hedge funds also typically do not calibrate their performance to risky benchmarks such as the Russell 3000, allowing them to take larger positions in assets they think are misvalued. These operational flexibilities combine with compensation arrangements that are more unbounded on the upside than most long-only institutions with the result that hedge funds are able to attract the most talented investment strategists and managers to work for them, including academics.
We argue that these advantages make hedge funds the most likely investors to seek to arbitrage market inefficiencies such as the accruals anomaly. We do not, however, propose that all hedge funds should, will or did seek to invest in the accruals anomaly. As in many subfields of finance, hedge funds and hedge fund managers specialize based on their experience, expertise and volume of assets under management. Thus, even as late as 1998 only a small number of hedge funds were in a position to profitably implement accounting-or fundamentals-based trading strategies because only a few hedge funds were employing -relative-value strategies seeking to profit by taking offsetting positions in two assets whose price relationships are expected to move in a direction favorable to these offsetting positions‖ (President's Working
Group on Financial Markets, 1999). Indeed, while the idea of fully signal-driven or computerized long-short hedge portfolios has been present in accounting research since at least the mid-1980s (e.g., Thomas, 1989, 1990) , it was not until the rise of Long Term
Capital Management in the late 1990s that the practitioner financial community heard widely that computers were managing a fund's entire portfolio.
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We therefore hypothesize that even though the accruals anomaly was theoretically knowable to and implementable by investors beginning in 1996, in practice only those investors with sufficient knowledge, opportunity, technology, and capital would have actively sought to exploit the accruals anomaly-foremost of which are large, sophisticated hedge funds. They, we propose, had in-house or could afford to acquire the outside expertise needed to recognize, understand and profitably realize the hedge returns that Sloan's 1996 paper had discovered.
We evaluate this proposition by first creating proxies for the impacts that hedge funds would have on the hedge returns to the accruals anomaly. Under the assumption that market inefficiencies are eventually arbitraged away-that is, capital is invested in traded arbitrage positions that earn positive risk-adjusted expected returns over time as the inefficiency is TRADING and AGG_TRADING will be negatively associated with returns to the anomaly. Each proxy is -annually based‖ in order to reflect the decision making process suggested by an investor implementing Sloan's (1996) accruals trading strategy, meaning that we assume that when institutional investors decide to invest in an accruals strategy, they make their trading and capital decisions based on the information available to them at or before March 31 st of each year.
Other explanations based on ideas in prior research
3.2.1 Arbitrage risk Mashruwala et al. (2006) propose that the presence of arbitrage risk limits the ability and desire of institutional investors to fully implement the accruals anomaly. In particular, if arbitrageurs hold undiversified portfolios and must bear idiosyncratic risk to earn abnormal returns, then idiosyncratic volatility is a primary concern for them (Pontiff, 2006) . This explanation predicts that the decline in hedge returns to the accruals anomaly will at least in part be explained by declines in the idiosyncratic risk of extreme accruals decile stocks. Following Mashruwala et al. (2006) , our proxy for arbitrage risk is idiosyncratic return volatility is IVOL it , the log of the standard deviation of residuals from a time-series market model regression of the daily returns of extreme accruals decile firm i's stock on the CRSP value-weighted index over the 125 trading days ending March 31 st . We use IVOL it in the panel regressions and AGG_IVOL t (the market capitalization-weighted average of IVOL it in year t) in the time-series regressions.
3.2.2 Prudent man concerns and structural barriers Lev and Nissim (2006) propose that prudent man concerns and structural barriers such as litigation risk, fiduciary responsibility, restrictions on short selling, restrictions on leverage and the requirements to benchmark performance prevent many institutional investors from implementing the accruals strategy. If correct, this view predicts that the decline in hedge returns to the accruals anomaly will at least in part be explained by declines in these factors.
After a careful search, however, we were unable to identify any major sustained changes to the prudent man concerns and structural barriers facing institutional investors over the period 1989-2008. 13 Although the absence of such changes only implicitly rejects Lev and Nissim's explanation, it is consistent with prior research that suggests that long-only institutional investors such as mutual funds have largely not pursued the anomaly (Ali et al., 2008) . It is also a large part of why we examine the role of hedge funds in explaining the demise of hedge returns to the accruals anomaly because hedge funds are largely unaffected by prudent man concerns and structural barriers-hedge funds face lower litigation risks than do mutual funds (since they require that their investors be accredited or qualified), no restrictions on short selling, few restrictions on leverage, and no requirements to benchmark performance to common equity benchmarks such as the Russell 3000. Lev and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) propose that high transaction costs may prevent investors from fully competing away the hedge returns to the accruals strategy.
Transaction costs
Evidence from Lev and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) indicates that the accruals anomaly is concentrated in firms likely to have high transaction costs. Applying the transaction cost explanation to the demise of the anomaly yields the prediction that the decline in hedge returns should at least in part be explained by a decline in the costs of trading extreme accrual decile stocks. 14 Our proxy for transaction costs in our panel regressions is PRICE it , the log of a firm's average price for the 125 trading days ending March 31 st . The intuition behind PRICE is that in terms of price impact of trading and fixed rate transaction costs, lower priced stocks will tend to have higher transaction costs than will higher priced stocks. In the time-series regressions we use AGG_PRICE t , the equally-weighted average of PRICE it in each year t.
13 On September 18, 2008 the SEC adopted an emergency order that temporarily banned most short selling in almost 1,000 financial stocks (Boehmer et al., 2009 ). However, because the ban was lifted just three weeks later and was restricted to financial stocks, we do not think it likely that the SEC's action had a material impact on the returns to the accruals anomaly over out full time period. 14 Two particular (albeit circumstantial) pieces of evidence that transactions costs have fallen over time are the change to pricing stocks in decimals in 2001 and the rise of algorithmic trading.
Investor misperception of the implications of accruals for firm value
Sloan (1996) argues that investors misperceive the true persistence of cash flows versus accruals such that high (low) accruals at time t are overvalued (undervalued). Going forward in time the market then on average corrects this error, leading to negative (positive) abnormal returns for high (low) accrual firms. In this view, the hedge return to trading on the accruals strategy is likely to be increasing in the magnitude of accruals in extreme accrual decile firms and decreasing in the relative persistence of such firms' accruals and cash flows. As such, the investor misperception explanation predicts that the decline in hedge returns to the accruals anomaly will at least in part be due to either extreme accrual decile firms having smaller accruals than they used to, and/or the degree of persistence in their accruals and cash flows having moved closer together. 
In equation (2), IB is annual income before extraordinary items, CF is annual operating cash flows, ACC = IB -CF, AVGTA is average annual total assets, and INT is an intercept. Outliers are deleted at the extreme 1% of each variable each year. We predict that both AGG_DIFFACC and AGG_RELPERSIST will be positively associated with returns to the anomaly.
Earnings management
Kothari, Loutskina and Nikolaev (2006) propose that managers face incentives to overstate earnings using accruals when their firm's equity is overpriced, so that high accruals (which are more likely to be prevalent in the extreme positive accrual deciles) indicate overvaluation and therefore negative future firm abnormal returns. This view suggests that the degree to which managers can manage accruals and/or the net benefits of doing so should be associated with hedge returns to the accruals anomaly over time. We test this prediction using two variables. The first is AGG_DIFFACC t defined in section 3.2.4. Under the premise that less extreme accruals are indicative of less earnings management, we propose that the time-series of hedge returns to the anomaly will be positively associated with AGG_DIFFACCR. The second variable we employ is AGG_SARBOX t , a dummy variable set to one each month on or after t = August 2002, zero otherwise, and predict that it will be negatively associated with the time-series of hedge returns to the anomaly. AGG_SARBOX is motivated by the observation that regulatory changes during the sample period such as the Sarbanes-Oxley act in 2002 and the associated scandals and subsequent scrutiny by regulators and investors that immediately preceded it have both decreased the ability of firms to manage earnings (e.g., through tighter internal controls) and decreased managers' incentives to manage earnings (e.g., through requiring CEOs and CFOs to sign off on financials and subjecting them to severe penalties for proven misstatements).
Changes in the quantity and timing of accruals information available to investors
The final explanation we evaluate is that there have been improvements over time in the quantity and timing of accruals information available to investors-specifically, that during our period of study it became more common for firms to voluntarily report both earnings and cash flows at their quarterly and annual earnings announcements well prior to the mandatory 10-Q and 10-K filing dates. If so, then this would have given investors more and better quality accruals information sooner, and thereby likely have reduced the degree of mispricing in accruals. 15 This would, we suggest, be particularly the case for institutional investors because real-time data providers such as Compustat and FactSet have over time increased the amount of detailed information they provide to their clients and the speed at which they provide it. We test this explanation using the variables CFEANN it and AGG_CFEANN t . The former is a dummy variable set to one if the Compustat Preliminary History database indicates that firm i released information about its operating cash flows in year t at its annual earnings announcement. The latter is the equally-weighted average of CFEANN it across firms in year t (viz., the percentage of firms that release operating cash flows information in their earnings announcement in year t according to the Compustat Preliminary History database). 15 We note here that having accruals information is a necessary but not sufficient condition for efficient pricing. Investors must also correctly understand the implications of accruals for future cash flows. As most faculty who have taught the statement of cash flows to students (even to aspiring accountants) will attest, getting students to identify and understand the prior causes and future consequences of accruals is a non-trivial exercise.
Testing the alternative explanations for the demise of the accruals anomaly
We test the various predictions described in sections 3. 
AGG_RELPERSIST, AGG_SARBOX).
We proceed to describe each approach in turn.
Analysis of the time-series of monthly hedge returns to the accruals anomaly
In Figure 3 , we present plots of the annual time-series of the aggregate variables we use to test the alternative explanations for the demise of hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) 
AGG_DIFFACC, AGG_RELPERSIST, AGG_SARBOX, and AGG_CFEANN).
Rather than using the four-factor risk-adjusted hedge returns reported in Table 1 and Figure 2 , we follow the approach taken in prior finance research (e.g., Fama and French, 1996) and use raw hedge returns in equation (3), controlling for the risk free rate and risk factors in-sample. 16 We note the following results from Table 4 . First, Model I of Table 4 yields the same inference as Model I of Table 2-namely that hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) annual accruals anomaly have reliably declined over time as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on YEAR. Second, the results from Models II -IX where only one candidate explanatory variable at a time is included indicate that six of the eight estimated coefficients reliably have the predicted signs (those on AGG_AUM, AGG_TRADING, AGG_PRICE, AGG_DIFFACC, AGG_SARBOX and AGG_CFEANN). Third, the proxies for arbitrage risk, AGG_IVOL, and the relative persistence of accruals and cash flows, AGG_RELPERSIST, do not have estimated coefficients that are significantly of the same sign as predicted in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.4, respectively. Fourth, the two best-fitting of Models II -IX as judged by adjusted R 2 are Models I (AGG_AUM) and II (AGG_TRADING), each of which tests the -influence of hedge funds trading on the anomaly‖ explanation proposed in section 3.1, and both adjusted R 2 exceed that of Model 1 (YEAR). Finally, and not surprisingly given the very high correlations among several of the independent variables, only one of the six significant coefficient estimates on Models II -IX remain significant when all eight explanatory variables are included (namely the fraction of annual earnings announcements that contain cash flow information) and one of the two previously insignificant coefficient estimates becomes significantly negative (the relative persistence of accruals and cash flows). We therefore conclude from Table 4 that while the -one 16 We obtain very similar inferences if we directly employ the four-factor risk-adjusted returns reported in Table 1 and Figure 2 as the dependent variable and omit the risk factors as controls.
candidate explanatory variable at a time‖ evidence supports-even favors-the hedge fund influence explanation, the power of this inference is low.
A panel approach to testing the explanations for the demise of the accruals anomaly
In this section, we report the results of adopting a panel data approach to testing the same explanations for the demise of the accruals anomaly as we scrutinized in section 4.1 through an aggregate level time-series method. We undertake the panel data approach for two reasons.
First, to the extent that choosing extreme deciles is arbitrary and may not reflect the optimal trading strategies of sophisticated investors, tests that use the full accruals distribution may provide a stronger, more relevant test of explanations for the demise of the anomaly. Second, the panel data approach is consistent with the characteristics-based regressions that Fama and French (2008) used to study the anomaly.
We expect firm-specific characteristics to be a stronger test than an aggregate, time series approach to the extent that either accruals mispricing is firm-level, sophisticated investors use firm-level screens (e.g., high idiosyncratic volatility stocks are eliminated from the universe of potential investments), or the underlying explanation is per se firm-specific. At the same time,
we recognize that there are drawbacks to the panel data approach. For example, measuring the explanatory variables at the firm-specific level may simply make the explanatory variable noisier. Further, not all of the variables can be defined or measured at the firm level (viz.,
AGG_AUM, AGG_DIFFACC and AGG_RELPERSIST).
The general structure of the panel data regressions we estimate is: where r it is the raw return of firm i in each of the t = 1, …,12 months beginning April of every year (i.e., after March 31 st , the annual date at which all non-risk-based explanatory variables are computed using only data available in real-time), RISK consists of the risk free rate and the risk factors EXCESS_VWRET, SMB, HML and UMD defined in Table 1 , EXPLAN consists of TIME (from Table 2 ) plus the full set of eight other candidate explanatory variables defined in sections 3.1 and 3.2, and ACC is firm i's accruals as defined in equation (1) scaled by its average total assets. In contrast to the time-series of hedge fund returns tests reported in Tables 3 and 4 (4), and equation (4) is estimated with year fixed effects included and standard errors that are clustered at the firm level.
There are two key features to the structure of equation (4). The first is that the accruals mispricing anomaly predicts that the coefficient on accruals ACC will be negative because high (low) accruals today should lead to negative (positive) future abnormal returns. The second is that the various explanations for the demise of the anomaly put forward in sections 3.1 and 3.2 yield sign predictions for the coefficients in equation (4) that are the opposite of those on the coefficients in equation (3). This is because the variables in EXPLAN are predicted to be dampening not exacerbating the negative coefficient . In order to avoid the risk of model misspecification yielding spurious significance on the coefficients, we include EXPLAN as a set of main effects but have no predictions for their coefficients . In Table 6 , we report the results of estimating a subset of the possible permutations of equation (3). We note the following. First, the estimated coefficients on ACC and ACC x TIME in Model I of Table 6 yields the same inference as Model I of Table 2 and Model 1 of Thus mirroring what we inferred from the analysis of hedge returns reported in Table 4 , the analysis of firm-specific abnormal returns in Table 6 indicates that the abnormal returns that arise from the mispricing of accruals are lower the higher are hedge fund assets under management, the smaller is the cross-sectional dispersion in accruals, and after Sarbanes-Oxley was introduced. In addition, but unlike in Table 4 , the results in Table 6 indicate that returns are lower the more similar is the persistence of accruals to the persistence of cash flows.
Third, Model VI indicates that none of the estimated coefficients on the four firm-specific variables interacted with accruals are significant (e.g., ACC x TRADING). This suggests that either measuring TRADING, IVOL, PRICE and CFEANN at the firm-specific level creates a great deal of measurement error, or that there truly are no firm-specific effects present for those variables. Finally, Model VII indicates that when equation (4) is estimated at its fullest, only two variables mediate the main effect of accruals, namely aggregate hedge fund assets under management and the overall persistence of accruals relative to the persistence of cash flows.
Overall, we infer from the results of the Models estimated in Tables 5 and 6 that while we cannot unambiguously identify the causal factor or factors involved, our analyses suggest-albeit with low power-that the demise of the accrual anomaly stems at least in part from a decline over time in the size of the mispricing signal (as measured by accruals in the extreme accrual deciles and the relative persistence of cash flows and accruals) and an increase over time in the capital invested by hedge funds into exploiting the signal (as measured by hedge fund assets under management, and trading volume in high accrual firms).
Estimating the dollar amount of hedge fund investments in the accruals anomaly
In this paper, we have proposed that hedge funds are the investors most likely to trade on the accruals anomaly and thereby arbitrage the mispricing that generates the strategy's abnormal returns. Given that some of the evidence presented in Tables 3-6 supports this argument, we turn to present some estimates of the dollar amount invested in the accruals anomaly by hedge funds.
Our method is to use the monthly returns of equity oriented hedge funds with sufficient data in the Hedgefund.net active fund database during 1989-2008 to estimate style weights on the accruals anomaly. We then use those weights as a proxy for the percentage of portfolio funds invested in the accruals anomaly. In the style analysis, we require at least 24 months of data.
The style analysis regressions employ the hedge portfolio returns to the accruals anomaly, the factor returns listed in Table 1 (Sharpe, 1992) . We require the weights to be positive and to sum to one. Using the fund-specific accruals strategy weights, which we assume to be constant over the entire sample period, we estimate annually the total funds invested in the accruals anomaly strategy as the sum of the estimated fund weights times the assets managed by funds with an estimated accrual strategy weight of at least 5%.
Panel A of Table 7 reports descriptive statistics for the fund-level weights. The mean weight on the accruals anomaly ACCANOM is a relatively small 3% as compared to those on other common anomalies-the weights on SMB, HML and UMD are 7%, 9% and 9%, respectively. 17 Although this suggests that on average hedge funds invest only a small amount in the accruals anomaly, there is substantial variation across hedge funds and it should be kept in mind that our focus is the total amount of money invested in the anomaly. 17 Our estimate of a 3% weight on the accruals anomaly is consistent with the conflicting or apparently weak findings in other research that have examined the extent to which institutional investors implement the accruals anomaly such as mutual funds (Ali, Chen, Yao and Yu, 2008; Lev and Nissim, 2006 ) and short sellers (Hirshleifer, Teoh and Yu, 2008; Richardson, 2000) . However, Hand and Green (2009) suggest that the appropriate benchmark for efficient arbitrage of an anomaly is the portfolio weight that a hypothetical institutional investor would place on the anomaly in a fully diversified portfolio. This is also related to Kothari and Shanken (2002) and Mashruwala et al. (2006) that look at the optimal portfolio tilt toward trading anomalies. Aside from this interest in the weight assigned to the accruals anomaly by sophisticated investors, we are interested in the magnitude of the dollars chasing the accruals anomaly and consider this the appropriate measure for examining the speed with which the accruals anomaly is arbitraged away.
Figure 4 graphs total hedge fund assets under management and the amount that we estimated has been invested in the accruals anomaly as of the end of each year. Figure 4 indicates that the latter has increased dramatically over the sample period, with the estimated peak value of dollars invested in the accruals anomaly being almost $60 billion in 2007. 18 We do, however, caution against placing too much reliance on our estimates. Style analysis can only present a very rough estimate of the fund strategy and it is subject to the estimation method and asset classes included in the estimation. Moreover, Hedgefund.net is neither a comprehensive sample nor necessarily an unbiased sample of the universe of equity oriented hedge funds. In addition, although we argue that hedge funds are the most likely investors in the accruals anomaly, it is likely that a subset of other investors such as mutual funds, insurance companies, banks and individuals implement an accruals anomaly strategy to some degree. Despite these limitations, our estimates provide a starting point for measuring the amount of capital that is required to be invested by arbitrageurs to compete away the market inefficiency captured by the accruals anomaly.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have documented that the hedge returns to Sloan's (1996) standard accruals anomaly have decayed in US stock markets to the point that they are no longer positive.
Our findings do not support the arguments made by some academics that the anomaly is illusory (e.g., Kraft et al., 2006; Khan, 2008; Wu et al., 2009 ), but they do substantiate statements made by key practitioners that in turn run counter to the predictions made by some academics (Lev and Nissim, 2006) regarding the persistence of the anomaly's returns.
As to why hedge returns to the accruals anomaly have dissipated, we propose and empirically evaluate a variety of alternative explanations, particularly focusing on the effects that large hedge funds may have had as they exploited the anomaly. With the strong caveat that the best data we are able to employ to test the predictions of the alternative explanations is limited, making it hard to arrive at confident inferences, we nevertheless find results that we conclude are consistent with the proposition that the anomaly's demise reflects two main factors: A decline in the size of the mispricing signal (as measured by accruals in the extreme accrual deciles and the relative persistence of cash flows and accruals) and an increase in the capital invested by hedge funds into exploiting the signal (as measured by hedge fund assets under management and trading volume in high accrual firms).
We suggest that the evidence we report indicates that quantitative hedge fundsparticularly those advised by prominent accounting academics or staffed with Ph.D.-trained professionals-are relevant for understanding why the accruals anomaly is currently not yielding positive returns. Although ours is not the first paper to document that the returns to an accounting-based anomaly can decline after the anomaly is publicized (Johnson and Schwartz 2001 provide similar evidence on the demise of post-earnings announcement drift after the Bernard and Thomas papers were published), our study is the first to test for a connection between anomaly returns and hedge funds. We argue that the returns to the accruals anomaly could be more realized and levered by quantitative hedge funds than by long-only mutual funds or fundamental traders. Moreover, the accruals anomaly was not just studied by its discoverer and the authors of related research academics such as Charles Lee and Scott Richardson. It was actively exploited by prominent hedge funds hiring said researchers away from their academic positions to work full-time for the funds. In our view, the life-cycle of the accruals anomaly points to how accounting scholarship can causally affect-not just associatively study-the capital markets and ultimately benefit society by not only discovering where significant market inefficiencies lie, but also by helping practicing professionals exploit the inefficiencies and thereby bringing prices better into line with fundamentals.
Our results also suggest that neither knowledge of the existence of the accruals anomaly nor capital flowing into exploiting it were rapid enough to cause prices to instantly adjust upon the 1996 publication of Sloan's seminal article in The Accounting Review. Instead, the anomaly's demise took years to occur. In this regard our work parallels the -slow moving capital‖ findings of Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) and is consistent with Lee's (2001) view on inadequacy of the assumption that price always equals fundamental value.
Finally, in closing we note that while the accruals anomaly is currently no longer producing abnormal returns, several questions remain unanswered. For example, if hedge fund trading drove away the returns to the anomaly, but now there are now no returns to be earned, will trading in the anomaly decline? And if it does, will the anomaly reappear? Our evidence is consistent with hedge funds improving market efficiency. However, recent research suggests 1990… 1990… 1991… 1992… 1993… 1994… 1995… 1995… 1996… 1997… 1998… 1999… 2000… 2000… 2001… 2002… 2003… 2004… 2005… 2005… 2006… 2007… 2008… Raw returns Four-factor risk-adjusted returns 
FIGURE 4
Estimated hedge fund assets invested in implementing the accruals anomaly strategy
This Figure reports estimates of the dollar amount invested in the accruals anomaly by hedge funds. We derive our estimate from the monthly returns of those equity oriented hedge funds that are present the Hedgefund.net active fund database during the period 1989-2008. We use these funds' monthly returns to estimate style weights on the accruals anomaly and then in turn use the weights as a proxy for the percentage of portfolio funds invested in the accruals anomaly. We require at least 24 months of returns data for a hedge fund to be included. The style analysis regressions employ the hedge portfolio returns to the accruals anomaly (see Figures 1 and 2 , and (Sharpe, 1992) . We require the weights to be positive and sum to one. Using the fund-specific accruals strategy weights, which we assume to be constant over the entire sample period, we estimate annually the total funds invested in the accruals anomaly strategy as the sum of the estimated fund weights times the assets managed by funds with an estimated accrual strategy weight of at least 5%. Sloan's (1996) accruals investment strategy on time trend variables. Long/short dollar neutral positions are taken on April 1 st of each year in the bottom/top decile of non-financial, 12/31 fiscal year-end firms sorted as of March 31 st using the most recently available 12-month rolling window scaled accruals, where accruals are computed from Compustat Point-in-Time balance sheet data and are scaled by average total assets. Raw returns are adjusted for four-factor risk by subtracting the 36-month rolling window time-series estimated coefficients multiplied by the realized factors from regressions of hedge portfolio returns on market premium, size, book-to-market and momentum factors from Kenneth French's website, with the first 36 months estimated in sample. In the regressions, TIME = 0.01 in April 1989 and increases by 0.01 per month through December 2008. TIMESQ = TIME x TIME. Regressions are estimated with Newey-West standard errors allowing for a maximum lag of 10 months. *** and ** indicate one-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Model
TABLE 7
This Table reports the results of estimating hedge fund weights and percent of funds invested in the accruals anomaly strategy using asset class/ style analysis (Sharpe, 1992) . Style analysis minimizes the variance of the difference between the fund's returns and the returns calculated from the optimal weights and the factor returns on a given set of factor or asset class returns by choosing the weights placed on each factor with weights that are constrained to be positive and sum to 1.0. We estimate style weights for each fund as long as the fund has at least 24 months of returns in the period. The asset class monthly returns we use are the value-weighted balance sheet and asset scaled 12-month accruals anomaly, ACCANOM, the one-month US Treasury Bill rate, RF, the CRSP value-weighted returns excess to RF (EXCESS_VWRET); the Fama-French SMB, HML, and UMD factor returns; and two credit market factors BOND (the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury notes) and CRSPREAD (the difference between the composite yield on Moody's Baa-rated long-term bonds and 10-year U.S. Treasury Notes). The analysis is estimated for active funds covered by Hedgefund.net for the period 1989-2008. The total amount invested in the accruals strategy is estimated as the sum of funds' estimated weights times funds' assets under management for funds classified as Equity Market Neutral, Equity Hedge, Multi-Strategy, Short Bias, and Unclassified. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of the fundlevel estimated style weights. Panel B provides estimated weights and estimated funds under management in the accruals anomaly. 
